The Cloudy Crystal Ball
Dear Readers,
Over the holidays, GlobalPost is collaborating with our sister publication, World Politics Review, to bring you special coverage of the key geopolitical issues facing some of the major regions of the world in 2025.
Today, Dalia Dassa Kaye takes a look at the Middle East.
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We wish you happy holidays and best wishes for the New Year.
Your GlobalPost Team
NEED TO KNOW
The Cloudy Crystal Ball
MIDDLE EAST
Making predictions about the Middle East is often an exercise in futility.
For example, few if any analysts foresaw the humiliating ousting of Syria’s longtime dictator, Bashar Assad. Ditto for Hamas’ brutal assault on Israel last year, which shocked the region and upended its political dynamics.
Could another “black swan” event emerge in 2025?
At the very least, it seems to be possible, as the Middle East is full of brittle regimes, festering conflicts, and ambitious external actors.
Such uncertainty underscores the need to constantly challenge assumptions. For example, after the 2023 Hamas attack exposed Israel’s vulnerabilities, many predicted the irrepressible rise and the strengthening of the “axis of resistance,” as the network of Iranian-backed allies fighting Israel and Western-aligned partners is known. A year later, the script has flipped, with Israel ascendant through its relentless use of military force in Gaza, Lebanon, and beyond. The fall of the Syrian president was the most stunning example of how the tables have turned, eroding Iranian – and Russian – power.
Meanwhile, the pendulum can shift again – and quickly. Those hoping for clarity in the emerging regional order are likely to be disappointed.
Nonetheless, several certainties remain. One is the continued expansion of Chinese economic engagement in the region driven by the sheer demand of its energy needs, which are unlikely to shift drastically in 2025. The other certainty is that Washington’s expansive military ties with regional partners will continue. This would have been the case regardless of who won the US presidential election in November because those ties serve members of the US foreign policy establishment who want to see continued US military engagement in the Middle East. But they also serve those in Washington – like President-elect Donald Trump – who say they want to see less US engagement because, after all, if the US is less engaged, it will need regional partners equipped to do the heavy lifting.
These two certainties combine to reinforce a third trend – regional resistance to choosing sides between the United States and China. Washington’s regional partners will continue hedging and adopting multi-alignment strategies as they focus on priorities at home. Middle East powerhouse Saudi Arabia, in particular, is likely to invest more in its domestic agenda than in grand bargain plans designed in Washington that pivot around Israel. The shifting balance of power triggered by Assad’s ousting is unlikely to change this.
However, just what the altered balance of power might look like and how key regional and external powers respond are both uncertain. As they unfold, several key developments will define how regional dynamics play out in the coming year and beyond.
The first is how post-Assad Syria evolves. Assad’s fall is cause for celebration even if what lies ahead remains uncertain, as Syrians themselves are well aware. Given the dizzying array of regional and global interests at stake, the outcomes in Syria will have wide-reaching consequences. The leading rebel group with the most influence in Damascus right now, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is trying to convey messages of moderation and inclusivity to interlocutors within and outside Syria. Though it remains on Western terrorist lists due to its al-Qaeda origins, the group appears to have transitioned into a nationalist Islamist movement that has abandoned transnational ambitions.
Nevertheless, anxiety remains about what type of leadership will emerge in what is sure to be a contentious transition process. Future infighting among opposition groups or external meddling could fuel instability and a return to conflict. Instability and security vacuums could also leave openings for the resurgence of militant extremists like Islamic State (IS), no doubt of grave concern for neighbors like Jordan. The US is taking no chances, continuing to strike IS camps and operatives in the areas of Syria formerly controlled by the Assad regime and Russia.
For now, Syrians are enjoying their freedoms after a horrific civil war, in which Assad’s repression led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of half of Syria’s pre-war population. Even suboptimal outcomes in the year ahead are likely to be better than the devastation Assad brought to Syria and the region.
After moving toward accommodation with Assad in recent years, Syria’s Arab neighbors are adjusting to the new reality and have strong interests in supporting a stable and economically viable Syrian state, even if democracy will not be a high priority for the authoritarian-led region. Gulf Arab states like the United Arab Emirates are particularly concerned about the Islamist nature of Syria’s new powerbrokers. The obstacles to building a new Syria and a peaceful post-Assad order are immense, even as many Syrians seem determined to avoid the mistakes of the past.
But it will be the region’s non-Arab states – Iran, Turkey, and Israel – that will wield the most influence over the changing geopolitical dynamics in 2025.
How Iran grapples with its diminished power following the fall of its close ally, Assad, is critical. Even before the downfall of Assad, Iran was facing mounting pressure as a result of Israel’s assault on its proxy, Hezbollah, until now Tehran’s most important non-state partner and a key linchpin in its deterrence strategy. With Hezbollah weakened and Iran having abandoned its position in Syria, Tehran seems to have lost the massive investments it has made into the axis of resistance over the years. The Houthis in Yemen continue to pose significant threats to commercial shipping in the Red Sea, but Iran’s influence over the group is more limited. Iran has far more sway among the Iraqi militia groups it supports, but even there its influence has often been exaggerated, given these groups’ own nationalist agendas. Indeed, ever since the fallout from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, talk of a rising “Shiite crescent” was often exaggerated, with Iran’s power and reach more limited than assumed.
In this sense, the regional balance of power may not be shifting as drastically as many perceive, since Iran’s weakness and Israel’s military dominance have long defined the regional landscape. The unprecedented direct rounds of Israel-Iran standoff aerial strikes in April and again in October demonstrated Iran’s significant missile and drone capabilities, but also ultimately its military inferiority and inability to deter further Israeli attacks. Indeed, while one should never underestimate the damage Iran can continue to inflict on Israel, the hits Iran has taken in the past few months already appear to be leading to some significant debates within Tehran about how to compensate for such deficits.
The most discussed possibility, with very serious global implications, would be Iran moving to weaponize its nuclear program to compensate for its conventional weakness. After the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog –censured Iran in late November for failing to cooperate over its nuclear program, Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi warned that Iranian leaders are debating whether the country should change its nuclear posture. The reimposition of all international sanctions – the so-called snapback mechanism in the Iran nuclear agreement that expires in October 2025 – could be the trigger for Iran to exit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the current environment, where Israel is less risk-averse and believes military attacks are producing results, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program is a plausible threat.
On the other hand, Iranian leaders are no doubt aware that moving toward nuclear weapons will only increase Israeli incentives to attack. Moreover, the assumption that nuclear deterrence can compensate for conventional weakness is questionable – there have been numerous cases where the possession of nuclear weapons did not prevent a conventional attack, including in the Middle East. Iran may instead prefer to maintain a nuclear hedging posture or even make further concessions to the IAEA to relieve pressure. This might allow it to buy time to focus on rebuilding its alliance network as well as its own defense capabilities.
Tehran can also resort to diplomatic approaches to deflect pressure, such as its continued rapprochement with Gulf Arab neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia. A new nuclear deal is also always a possibility, though it will prove difficult to achieve, given what is sure to be increased US and European emphasis on Iran’s non-nuclear activities – including its missile capabilities –on which Tehan will be reluctant to compromise given its growing vulnerability to Israeli attacks.
As Iran struggles to compensate for its losses, Turkey has emerged from recent developments as the perceived regional winner in Syria. Ankara has long supported the Syrian opposition and indirectly backed HTS. Assad’s fall advances Turkey’s primary interests there – the return of millions of Syrian refugees currently in Turkey; and the weakening of Kurdish opposition groups on Turkey’s border, some of which are aligned with Washington. Indeed, Turkish bombing of Kurdish positions accelerated in the days after Assad’s overthrow, and Turkey-watchers see Turkish gains against the Kurds as a play for leverage that might help encourage the incoming Trump administration to withdraw its forces from Syria.
But Ankara still faces risks, including the potential strengthening of extremist groups if instability increases and leads to terrorist attacks within Turkey itself. It is also unclear if Syria’s emerging leaders will remain beholden to Turkey once they consolidate power and begin pursuing national goals, or whether Turkish gains in Syria will translate into wider regional influence.
And then there’s Israel. Iran’s losses in Syria and Israeli military successes in degrading Hezbollah appear to be unequivocal wins. Underscoring Hezbollah’s weakened state, the group agreed to a ceasefire with Israel in Lebanon without one being implemented in Gaza, as it had long demanded. As for Gaza, Israel has demolished Hamas – but at a devastating humanitarian cost to the territory’s civilian inhabitants. Israel’s brutal war – even a former Israeli defense minister has called its operations in northern Gaza “ethnic cleansing” – has come with enormous cost with regard to its reputation internationally and regionally.
Israel will face other challenges. Syria’s new Islamist leaders are focused inward for now, but over time they may turn against Israel. Indeed, the nom de guerre of the head of HTS is al-Jolani, referencing the Golan Heights from which his family was expelled after Israel seized and occupied the territory in 1967. Hezbollah is weakened but not eliminated. Iran still has capabilities to attack Israel directly. The Gaza war grinds on, leaving Israel’s reserve units under strain while the remaining hostages still being held by Hamas languish. Despite Israel’s expanding borders – it just established a new buffer zone along the Golan Heights inside Syria –the areas where its population feels safe to live continue to shrink.
But Israel’s greatest vulnerability continues to be its existential conflict with the Palestinians. Even if the current Israeli government agrees to a ceasefire in Gaza next year – or possibly even before the end of this one – it is unlikely to lead to a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza or a reversal of expanding Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Indeed, Netanyahu and his coalition continue to work on the pre-Oct. 7 assumption that the Palestinian issue can be decoupled from its normalization in the wider region. The incoming Trump administration will only empower such views. Trump’s former adviser on Israel, Jason Greenblatt, made this stance explicit at the Doha Forum in early December, arguing that the Palestinian issue can be separated from regional politics and that Trump should not – and would not – pressure Israel to resolve it.
In the Middle East, the balance of power may be shifting, but the direction in which it is going is unclear. And any reshaping that unfolds is likely to come from the region itself in ways that may be surprising, that may not always align with the aspirations of external powers, but will likely defy predictions.
Dalia Dassa Kaye is a senior fellow at the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations.
THE WORLD, BRIEFLY
The World, Briefly section will return on Jan. 3, 2025.
DISCOVERIES
A Human Speed
The human brain is capable of limitless imagination, but that doesn’t mean it’s superfast.
Scientists recently discovered that when it comes to thinking, our noggins operate at an average speed of just 10 bits per second (bps).
This rate pales in comparison with the billion bps processed by the sensory systems, revealing a significant mismatch between perception and cognition, according to a new study.
“This is an extremely low number,” explained Markus Meister, a neuroscientist at the California Institute of Technology and co-author of the paper, in a statement. “Every moment, we are extracting just 10 bits from the trillion that our senses are taking in and using those 10 to perceive the world around us and make decisions.”
Meister and his colleague Jieyu Zheng analyzed nearly a century of research across neuroscience, psychology, and human performance to calculate this cognitive bottleneck.
From reading to solving Rubik’s Cubes, human decision-making consistently hovers around 10 bps – a speed comparable to casual typing.
The study raises a series of questions, such as how can individual neurons in the brain transmit far more than 10 bps and how can one-third of the brain’s 85 billion neurons be dedicated to high-level thinking.
Adding to this puzzle is why humans can only focus on one thought at a time, while sensory systems process multiple inputs simultaneously.
Meister and Zheng theorized that this sluggishness could be evolutionary: Early nervous systems primarily helped organisms navigate toward food or away from danger, tasks that require following a single path.
This limitation persists in modern humans, the team explained, likening human thought to “navigation through a space of abstract concepts.”
“Our ancestors have chosen an ecological niche where the world is slow enough to make survival possible,” the authors wrote. “In fact, the 10 bps are needed only in worst-case situations, and most of the time our environment changes at a much more leisurely pace.”
Other neuroscientists told Scientific American that the findings could reshape neuroscience, prompting researchers to explore how this bottleneck affects complex tasks such as planning and problem-solving.
“Nature, it seems, has built a speed limit into our conscious thoughts, and no amount of neural engineering may be able to bypass it,” said neuroscientist Tony Zador, who was not involved in the study. “Why? We really don’t know, but it’s likely the result of our evolutionary history.”