The Shadow Army: For Iraqis, Reining in Iraqi Militias Is a High-Stakes Move

When gunmen from Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah militia stormed Iraq’s Agriculture Ministry in July, it wasn’t about farming policy, it was a raw demonstration of power. A corrupt ministry director, resisting his removal, had called in the militia to block the appointment of his replacement. The standoff turned deadly when police intervened. Three people died, and nine more were wounded. 

Afterward, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani admitted the incident exposed a deeper truth about Iraq and its “formations that act outside the chain of command,” as a government investigation into the incident described these militias. As a result, he promised accountability and approved sweeping disciplinary and legal measures against senior commanders in a paramilitary force, an unusual move for an Iraqi leader: “Security agencies must operate under laws and be subject to them and be held accountable.” 

That, however, is easier said than done, say analysts.  

“When a sitting Iraqi prime minister dares to confront Kata’ib Hezbollah, the stakes are never low,” wrote analysts Burcu Ozcelik and Tamer Badawi of the United Kingdom’s RUSI think tank. 

Militias began developing in Iraq after the US invasion of the country in 2003. Then in 2014, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formed to fight the Islamic State militant group, which that year began to take over large swathes of the country. Today, the PMF has swollen to about 238,000 fighters – larger than the entire US Marine Corps. They operate through 60 disparate factions, with the biggest Shiite Iran-linked groups, Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, each fielding about 10,000 men. 

The PMF was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016. However, in practice, it still operates with significant autonomy and without transparency, observers say.  

The Iraqi government spends $3.5 billion a year on the PMF, the same amount it spends on its health ministry. The fighters control checkpoints, where they collect “fees” from drivers and traders. Their influence reaches into every aspect of society, from parliament to the courts to more everyday matters such as licenses and trade. 

This summer, lawmakers attempted to give the militias even more authority, debating a bill that would have put the PMF on the same legal status as the army, with its own commander and academy. Critics, however, warned it would create a parallel military, although in reality, it already serves as such.

However, the US and the UK pushed hard against the bill. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned it would “institutionalize Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups undermining Iraq’s sovereignty.” Britain’s ambassador, Irfan Siddiq, added that some PMF units do not always follow the prime minister’s orders and questioned whether their wartime role should persist in peacetime.  

Facing this pressure, al-Sudani’s government abruptly withdrew the bill, blindsiding lawmakers.  

The legislation, say analysts, ignored the entrenched problems with the PMF: “Factions have overrun the organization, siphoning off state resources, exploiting their positions for personal gain, and shielding themselves from accountability under the banner of a patriotic legacy they no longer represent,” wrote Ali al-Mawlawi of Horizon Advisory, a London-based consultancy for the Stimson Center. “In practice, rogue elements not only operate outside the formal chain of command but at times actively undermine the authority of the state.” 

As a result, there is no question, analysts say, that the PMF must be regulated because they pose a threat to the country. “To mitigate the risk of Iraq becoming embroiled in a regional conflict, the PMF must be reformed so that these forces do not become a justification for undermining the country’s hard-fought stability,” al-Mawlawi added.  

However, the solution must come from within, not from Western pressure, analysts say, adding that trying to force a showdown or dismantle the militias without a plan could “backfire and destabilize the country by emboldening pro-Iran groups who are less risk-averse.”

Still, the militias stayed out of the Israel-Iran war in June. Analysts say the militias are eschewing open conflict that could trigger external retaliation from the US, and instead they are focusing on consolidating their hold domestically, particularly with regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections in November.

PMF-aligned parties in the Shiite Coordination Framework currently dominate the national parliament and provincial councils after success in the December 2023 local elections, mainly due to low turnout amid a boycott called by influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in protest of militias’ political influence. 

That’s due to veteran politician and PMF leader Falih al-Fayyadh having shaped the PMF into “something like a political-military bloc that can seek to influence parliament, rather than a neutral security force,” wrote World Politics Review. 

Many Iraqis want the militias brought under control because they hinder the economy, promote violence, and silence dissent, analysts say. As a result of domestic and external pressure, Iraq now faces a hard choice: fold militias deeper into the state or confront them and risk another cycle of violence.  

“The debate in Baghdad is no longer about whether the PMF may remain as currently constituted – that question has been answered in Washington. Al-Sudani faces overwhelming pressure to stop tolerating an Iranian-aligned parallel army within the Iraqi state,” wrote Iraqi analyst and commentator Jasim Al-Azzawi in Al Jazeera.  

“The risks are substantial,” he added. “Paramilitary groups loyal to Iran may violently resist dissolution. Tehran, despite its weakened regional position, retains the capacity to foment chaos across Iraqi territory… Iraq, weary of war, may yet be hurled back into civil conflict. But if Iraqi institutions manage to withstand the storm, this would pave the way towards stronger sovereignty, which the Iraqi state has been direly lacking since the 2003 US invasion.”